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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES
COMPELLING ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES
One of the most controversial methods of settling labor disputes
yet contrived has been compulsory arbitration. Generally, that system
involves the establishing of an impartial board of arbitrators which,
after collective bargaining proves futile, decides the issues involved
and makes them binding on the disputing parties. Since the end of
World War II, statutes providing for compulsory arbitration of labor
disputes in public utilities have been enacted in eleven states.1 In their
essence, very little difference is to be found in the provisions. All provide a machinery of compulsory arbitration, generally preceded by an
attempt at conciliation, and provide a sanction for their enforcement.
Of course, with the passage of these acts, questions immediately arise
relative to the constitutionality of the provisions therein. Consequently,
a discussion involving the limitations imposed by the Constitution is
deemed timely.
A review of the recent cases on this issue, of which there are relatively few in number, reveals that one of the arguments most frequently presented is based on the Thirteenth Amendment. 2 The contentions
are that the statutes as applied impose a form of compulsory service
or involuntary servitude in that the sanctions therein are applied not
to the quitting of any individual employee, but to the quitting in concert. The positi6n is taken that what is lawful for one man to do individually, cannot become unlawful because a group does it in simultaneous action. However, in Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Workers
Federation, a New Jersey court decided that this distinction was vital,
a strike being an entirely different act from individual resignation. 3
The court went on to say that the rights secured by the Constitution
are secured to individuals and not to classes. It was observed that the
statute nowhere provides any punishment for an individual who- decides
not to work under the agreement reached by compulsory arbitration.
The individual employee may surrender his employment at any time,
1Florida, Laws of Fla., 1947, General Laws, Vol. I, c. 23911; Indiana, Act

of 1947, Vol. II, c. 341, p. 1355; Michigan, Public Acts, 1947; Minnesota,
Laws of Minn., 1947, c. 335; Missouri, Laws of Mo., 1947, Vol. I, p. 348;
Nebraska, Laws of Neb., 1947, Leg. Bill 349; New Jersey, N.J. Statutes Ann.,
Permanent Edition, Title 34, Labor and Workmen's Comp., 1947; Pennsylvania, Laws of Penn., Vol. II, 1947, No. 485, p. 1161; Texas, General and
Special Laws, Reg. Sess., 1947, c. 84; Virginia, Acts of Assembly, 1947, c. 9;
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat., Vol. I, c. 111, 1947.
2 U.S. CONST., Art. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ...
shall exist within the United States. .. ."
3 Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation, 142 N.J. Eq. 185, 61 A.

(2d) 570 (1948).
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which in and of itself preserves the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Much of the legal attack on compulsory arbitration has centered
around the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Three specific
theories have been advanced. Firstly, it is contended that the statutes
interfere with the employees' liberty of contract without due process
of law.4 Much of the argument here seeks to establish that due process
of law is denied employees of public utilities by that part of these state
laws that compels them to make contracts with the employer on terms
decided upon by a state board, thereby denying them the right to make
a contract on a bargaining basis. In the early Adair v. United States'
and Coppage v. Kansas6 cases the doctrine was enunciated that the due
process clause precluded the states from fixing terms of employment.
In 1923, the Supreme Court in the historic Charles Wolff Packing Co.
case again construed the due process clause as forbidding state legislation to fix hours and wages. In the latter case, the Court relied on a
distinction between businesses according to whether they were or were
not "clothed with a public interest."7 But, beginning with the case of
Nebbia v. New York, the concept of public interest has undergone a
marked change. 8 In discarding the public interest test, the Court in
the Nebbia case stated that the phrase "affected with a public interest"
can mean no more than that an' industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. Consequently, in Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern I. and A. Co., it was said that the due
process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the state
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to legislate
against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs and which they regard as offensive to the
public welfare.9 It is hardly conceivable that legislation of this type
would not have the effect of promoting the public health, safety, and
morals. Certainly the progress of invention, the development of transportation, and the growth of large-scale production has made our
modern industrial society an increasingly complex interdependent
4 U.S.

Co rsr., Art. XIV, § 1: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ..."
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908)
(employers had the constitutional right to discriminate against union members through the use of "yellow dog" contracts).
6 Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915)
(a state law banning "yellow dog" contracts was invalid).
5

7Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522,
43 S.Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280 (1923).
8Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1495
(1933); accord, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578,
81 L.Ed. 708, 108 A.L.R. 1330 (1936).

9Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 69 S.Ct.
251 (1949).
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entity. The change to a predominantly urban and industrial nation has
resulted in an economic structure in which each part is dependent on
every other. Without a doubt, public utilities are one of those essential
parts. Recognizing this fact, the Court in Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federationheld that a strike stopping or threatening
to stop the operation of a public utility is clearly within the power of
the state to prohibit.10
The second objection, on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
that the employee has been deprived freedom of speech by being restrained from exercising his right to picket and strike. This argument
undoubtedly falls within the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment
includes within its protection those fundamental rights that are embodied in the first eight amendments," with freedom of speech classified as one of those fundamental rights.' 2 The right to strike and the
right to picket are necessarily embodied in the broader constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. However, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly said that neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth
Amendment confers the absolute right to strike.'3 Within limits,
workers may organize for lawful purposes. They may engage in peaceful picketing and they may strike to accomplish lawful ends. But again,
all these rights and all the constitutional guarantees are subject to regulation under the police power of the state, in the interest of the public
welfare.' 4
Thirdly, it is claimed that the employees of a public utility, by reason of their employment, have been denied equal protection of the
laws. That the employees of a public utility are but a segment of a
national labor organization and that as individuals they are cogs in
the huge economic wheel in the same manner as any laborer in another
business, are propositions not to be denied. It has long been recognized,
however, that it is valid to place employees of a public utility in a
separate class from other employees for purposes of regulation.' 6 The
public utility, as a private enterprise, has necessarily been subjected to
the regulation and control of the state. It is reasonable to place corresponding limitations on the rights of employees where such employment
10 Supra, note 3.

11 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527
2 (1932).
' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1939).
' 3 Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 47 S. Ct. 86, 71 L.Ed. 248 (1924);
approved, International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 69

S. Ct 516 (1949).

-4United Gas Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Wis. Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, 23 L.R.R.N. 2243 (1948); cf. Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., supra, note 9.
15 U. S. CoNsT., Art. XIV, § 1: ". . . nor shall any state deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

16 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1917).
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is accepted in a business charged with a public interest. Natural persons
are as necessary as capital to keep utility services flowing freely to the
public. It is that responsibility and public duty that has made the classi7
fication reasonable.'
A further major argument advanced, that the legislature unlawfully
delegated legislative power, is based on the division of powers doctrine
which is applicable to both our federal and state systems of government. Only on one occasion have these statutes been successfully attacked on this ground. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that their
statute was unconstitutional insofar as it provided for a circuit judge
to be chairman of the board of arbitrators. s It was there considered
that such was a conferring of administrative and non-judicial powers
and duties upon a judicial officer in violation of the state constitution.
Generally, however, it is accepted that legislative power is not unconstitutionally delegated to a board of arbitration. Adequate standards
are provided and as the New Jersey Court has stated, the statutes imply
that the board fix just and reasonable wages and conditions of employment, such standards being as definite as the subject matter permits. 9
None of the statutes delegate the power to make a law.
In the recent Lincoln case it was said that the United States Supreme
Court "has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what
are found to be .injurious practices in their internal commercial and
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some valid
federal law." 20 This brings us to the remaining consideration whether
there is any conflict in the state acts afid the National Labor Relations
Act. 2' The question becomes significant, inasmuch as most, if not all,
of the enterprises affected by the states acts would come within the
doctrine laid down in the Shreveport case, to the effect that Congress
can reach admittedly local and intrastate activities having such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that their control is essential
22
to the security, efficiency, and maintenance of that traffic.
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides in part that the
National Labor Relations Board can cede jurisdiction to a state agency
in cases involving the transportation industry which are predominantly
local in character, "unless the provisions of the state statute applicable
.to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with
17 Supra, note 3.

Is Local 170, Transport Workers Union of America v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332,
34 N.W. (2d) 71 (1948).
19 Supra, note 3.
20
21

22

Supra, note 9.
Colloquially known as the Wagner Act, amended by the Taft-Hartley- Act,
1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec. 141 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 141 et seq.
Houston, E. and W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58

L.Ed. 1341 (1913).
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the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction
inconsistent therewith.2 3 Section 13 of the Act reads "nothing in
this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
' 4
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
The import of Section 10(a) indicates that it was designed in part to
preclude inconsistent action on the part of a state. But section 13 has
provided an exception to that objective. The intent, evidently, was to
expressly permit the limiting of the right to strike, it being understood
that such limiting must also be within constitutional confines. Therefore, it would seem that the state's right to enact regulations in the
exercise of its police power is expressly recognized even though the
field may be one in which there is concurrent jurisdiction.
Section 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act has made the refusal to
bargain collectively, in good faith, an unfair labor practice.2 - Undoubtedly the attempt thereby was to encourage collective bargaining. The
question thus arises, whether the compulsory arbitration statutes do
not inject into the minds of the negotiating parties the feeling that they
need not negotiate in good faith, but can squeeze the other party into
arbitrating their differences, the result being to discourage bargaining
on a good faith level.2 6 If that argument can validly be developed, the
result would be to violate the spirit or to negative the affirmative policy
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Some light is thrown on the subject in Hill
27
v. Florida.
There, a Florida statute required a license for business
agents of labor unions, prescribed their qualifications, and made the
issuance of the license depend upon a determination that they possessed
these qualifications. The statute also provided for criminal and injunction proceedings for the violation thereof. An employer had refused
to bargain with a duly selected representative of workers on the ground
that the representative had not secured a Florida license as a business
agent. The Supreme Court held that statute repugnant to the National
Labor Relations Act. The Court said that the operation of the statute
had interfered with the collective bargaining process, where the declared purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to encourage collective bargaining. The interference resulted from the sanction pro2s
Supra, note 21, sec. 10(a).
24

Supra, note 21, sec. 13.

25Sec. 8(a) (5)
2 8 to

states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."

This point is raised in a report by the Labor Committee of the Twentieth
Century Fund, "Strikes and Democratic Government" (1947) 20-31, reprinted

in Gregory and Katz, "Labor Law: Cases, Materials and Comments," at
p. 1257. It was suggested that government compulsion methods might give
rise to dangerous interference with the process of collective bargaining since
it might well be that one party or the other would prefer government interference to an acceptance of the other party's proposal.
27 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S. Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782 (1944).
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visions of the statute which bring about a situation inconsistent with
the federally protected process of collective bargaining. It was reasoned
that if the union or its representatives acted as bargaining agents without securing the required license, presumably they would be liable to
criminal prosecution and to punishment for contempt of court in failing to comply with the injunction decree. Such would be a denial of
free bargaining processes. Whether the apparent squeeze one party
can put on the other by failing to subjectively bargain in good faith,
and thereby bring into being the compulsory arbitration machinery, will
amount to such an obstacle to collective bargaining as to be inconsistent
with the Federal Act, is a matter yet to be judicially resolved. However, it would seem that the Hill case would serve as valid precedent
for the party attacking the statutes.
The cost of permitting management and labor to freely fight out
their differences is bound to be heavy, even though collective bargaining is made to work more effectively than in the past. The price of compulsory peace, however, may be as great or even greater. This will be
particularly true, if, as both industrialists and labor leaders fear, it
results in political regulation of wages, prices, and other phases of the
economy. Coolness and caution appear to be cardinal virtues in this
area of legislation. It is to be remembered that the serious strike situation of 1946 was essentially the result of cut-backs in take-home earnings, rising prices, shortages in essential labor and materials, and many
other elements. When the economy has once again returned to a reasonable balance, a more normal type of collective bargaining will return. Possibly it would prove expedient to try voluntary collective
bargaining a little longer in the field of labor disputes.
DAMNEL

A.

KRAEmER

